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Thousands of biotech companies are developing promising products, but have
insufficient resources to complete the clinical testing process, while large, well-funded
companies have increasingly focused on the need to access external innovation. As a
result, licensing deals are an essential and growing part of this industry. Yet, casting a
shadow over the licensing market is the classic Lemons Problem: Does asymmetrical
information put licensees at a severe disadvantage, leading to a market dominated by
inferior opportunities, with the best products retained for internal development? Our
analysis of clinical stage products developed over three decades shows that there is
no Lemons Problem. We discuss the results of this first apples-to-apples analysis of the
biomedical licensing market, and suggest reasons why the Lemons Problem does not
exist where it might be most expected—in a high technology, knowledge-based industry.
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INTRODUCTION
Multi-billion dollar investments and high failure rates are “business as usual” for the
biopharmaceutical industry (DiMasi et al., 2016). With thousands of development-stage
companies, most of which have limited access to the resources required to develop a new drug
all the way through the FDA approval process, licensing deals have always been an integral part
of this industry. In recent years, there has been an even greater emphasis on investments by large
companies in external innovation (M&As, joint ventures, in-licensed drugs), with 2015 being an all-
time record year for the industry (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009). Yet, casting a shadow over this
lively licensing market is the classic Lemons Problem identified by Nobel laureate George Akerlof:
Will the licensors’ superior knowledge about the products put licensees at a severe disadvantage,
leading to a market dominated by inferior opportunities, with the best products retained for
internal development?
Our analysis of all clinical stage products developed over three decades by the
most prominent biotechnology companies shows that there is no Lemons Problem
in biopharmaceutical licensing. In this article, we will discuss the results of this first
apples-to-apples analysis of the biomedical licensing market, and suggest reasons why
the Lemons Problem, a phenomenon taught to every first-year MBA student, does not
exist where it might be most expected—in a high technology, knowledge-based industry.
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BACKGROUND
The economic, finance and strategic management literature has
often identified the information asymmetry that can lead to
a Lemons Problem as an important element of transactions
involving licensing and technology transfer in high technology
industries (Gallini and Wright, 1990; Wuyts and Dutta, 2008),
including the biotech industry (Lerner andMerges, 1998; Antelo,
2003; Audretsch and Feldman, 2003; Rothaermel and Deeds,
2004; Pisano, 2006, unpublished manuscript; Mason et al., 2008).
The central hypothesis has been that the company originating the
product has superior information compared to the in-licensor,
and as such it would only seek to out-license drugs of inferior
quality while keeping the good ones for internal development.
Empirical studies of various types of inter-firm transactions—
including licenses, partnerships, and other alliances—have
produced mixed results on this issue. Pisano observed a Lemons
Problem in a study of 260 biotechnology projects, but the
analysis assumed that multiple indications are the equivalent of
multiple products, which is not representative of the biotech
licensing market, in which indication-splitting is rare (Pisano,
unpublished manuscript). Arora et al. (2009), who found no
evidence of a Lemons Problem, focused only on preclinical
stage products, and again treated separate indications as if they
were separate products. A third recent analysis of products in-
licensed by the 50 largest pharmaceutical companies suggests
the opposite of a Lemons Problem. This study by DiMasi
et al. (2010) seems to support the conclusion that drugs in-
licensed by the 50 largest pharmaceutical companies (ranked
by sales) have higher success rates than those developed in-
house, although because the timing of in-licensing is not
specified, this observation could be driven by comparing later
stage in-licensed products with in-house products that were
selected for development on the basis of only preclinical
data.
Whether a Lemons Problem exists in biotech licensing,
especially for clinical stage products, thus remains an open and
important question. Economic theory predicts that it should, but
the studies to date have been inconclusive. Perhaps the licensor’s
knowledge of the product and the underlying technology leads to
information asymmetry and a Lemons Problem. Yet, considering
the high failure rates and the multiple “unknown unknowns”
involved in the drug development process (Hay et al., 2014), it
is far from certain that the out-licensing party will necessarily
have any better knowledge than the licensee of the drug’s ultimate
potential to treat a specific disease safely and effectively enough to
receive FDA approval.
Our study directly addresses this issue: is there a Lemons
Problem in biotech licensing transactions, as evidenced by the
success rates of internally retained products compared to those
that have been out-licensed. In designing the analysis, our goal
has been to make as direct a comparison as possible. One
key characteristic of prior studies is that they do not control
for when in the development process each of the licensed-in
drugs was acquired. Moreover, we exclude any marketing or co-
development agreements, so that our final sample consists of
only pure licensing agreements. Finally, we have included in the
dataset only transactions in which biotech companies were both
licensee and licensor.
DATA STRUCTURE AND METHODS
In order to assess the existence of a Lemons Problem in biotech
licensing transactions, we assembled a hand-annotated sub-
data set on the basis of Thomson Reuters’ Recap BioPortfolio
Index (RBI) of 170 biotech firms. According to Recap IQ,
RBI companies are chosen based on their size, breadth of
clinical programs, revenue (if relevant), and scientific innovation
to serve as a representative benchmark data set for the
industry. Importantly, “these companies also tend to focus on
new, untested technologies (recombinant DNA, monoclonal
antibodies, and novel molecular targets) and unmet medical
needs (rather than developing “me-too” or second-generation
products) to a greater degree than “traditional” pharmaceutical
companies” (Recap, 2016). These are the types of products where
the novelty of the technology would seem to create the strongest
possibility of information asymmetry.
This annotated set of data enabled us to investigate the
full clinical development history for the total population of
drugs that were launched by these 170 biotech companies into
clinical development between 1980 and 2012. Pharmaceutical
companies, defined as any drug development company founded
before 1975, are excluded in this data set. From this total
population, we extracted 196 in-licensed and 634 in-house
originated drug development cases with a determined outcome,
i.e., those cases for which all initiated first and secondary
indication trials have either been terminated or have led to a
market launch of the drug. Market launch success versus failure
was determined for each individual drug development case. A
“success” case was defined as any market launch or approval
of the drug for any indication. Multiple launches of the same
drug for various indications were still treated as a single success
case. Correspondingly, only if all first and secondary indications
were terminated was the drug development project classified as a
“failure” case. Drugs with uncompleted and ongoing clinical trials
were not considered in this study. The 196 in-licensing cases were
re-categorized into sub-populations according to the clinical
stage at which the compound was in-licensed (see Table 1).
Using this data set, we compared the success rates of: (i) phase
I in-house originated drugs vs. drugs in-licensed in phase I; (ii)
phase II in-house originated drugs vs. drugs in-licensed in phase
II. Phase III drugs were excluded from our analysis due to the
small sample size of in-licensed drugs (n= 17) (see Table 1).
TABLE 1 | Number of in-licensed and in-house developed projects in phases I-III
in utilized biotech data set.
Clinical trial In-house In-licensed
Phase I 634 48
Phase II 439 52
Phase III 190 17
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FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
Our main finding (depicted in Figure 1) is that, for the biotech
industry, in-licensed and in-house products had statistically
comparable success rates. Specifically, we find that phase I
licensed-in drugs have a success rate of 23%, which is comparable
to the 21% success rate of in-house developed drugs. Similarly,
phase II licensed-in drugs have a success rate of 29%, which is not
statistically different from the 30% of in-house developed drugs.
Taken together, these results suggest that there appears to be no
Lemons Problem in the biotechnology industry.
In 2008, Myriad Genetics licensed to H. Lundbeck the
European rights to Flurizan, a product that had successfully
completed Phase II trials and was then in Phase III trials. Flurizan
was being developed to treat Alzheimer’s disease, and Lundbeck
was an international pharmaceutical company that specialized
in the development and commercialization of products for
central nervous system diseases such as Alzheimer’s. Lundbeck
paid Myriad $100 million upon signing the agreement and
agreed to pay up to $250 million in connection with regulatory
approvals, plus commercial milestones and royalties. Six weeks
later, Flurizan failed to achieve satisfactory Phase III results and
was abandoned.
While that example looks like strong evidence of a Lemons
Problem, the industry can provide plenty of counter-examples.
In 1995, biotech company Idec Pharmaceuticals entered into
a licensing transaction with Genentech. The primary product
involved in the transaction was a monoclonal antibody that
had completed Phase II clinical trials. Genentech acquired a
>50% commercial interest in the product, plus an option to
acquire commercial interests in two additional products, for
an upfront payment of $9 million ($5 million of which was
in the form of a purchase of preferred stock), a commitment
to purchase $17.5 million of Idec equity, and $30.5 million
FIGURE 1 | Marketing approval success rate comparison between in-licensed
and in-house originated drugs in phases I and II.
in milestone and option payments. The product, now called
Rituxan, was approved 2 years later, and has become one of
the biopharmaceutical industry’s most successful blockbusters.
Genentech’s total investment of less than $60 million rapidly
returned hundreds of millions of dollars of annual profits
from the sales of Rituxan, plus a substantial return on the
equity investment. By 2008, worldwide sales of Rituxan reached
approximately $5 billion.
Seen together, these two examples emphasize the impressive
number of unknowns in the drug development process, which
is likely to lead to a lack-of-information symmetry shared by
licensor and licensee alike. In these transactions, the licensor
and licensee may have different opinions about the likelihood of
success, the time, and cost of further development, the strength of
patent protection, the size of the market and other common drug
development variables, but it is not clear that there is knowledge
available to the licensor that puts it in the position of someone
trying to get rid of a lemon, as in Akerlof ’s famous example
of a used car seller—i.e., possessing otherwise hidden technical
knowledge that provides the seller with a distinct advantage over
the buyer in assessing the value of the item being sold (Akerlof,
1970). Unlike Akerlof ’s owner of a perfectly running used car,
who has no reason to sell, especially into a market that discounts
its value for defects that are hidden to the buyers, a biotech
companymay license even its “crown jewels” to another company
if it does not otherwise believe that it will have access to the
financial resources to survive and to develop the product on its
own. By analogy, Akerlof ’s car owner might well sell a perfect car,
even in a discounted market, if he cannot afford to put gas in it.
Meanwhile the party with plenty of cash for gas, that is, a larger
company with abundant resources and an inadequate internal
pipeline, has an urgent need for the car. This need of licensors
for resources, and of licensees for products to fill the pipeline, is a
strong enoughmotivation for both companies to pursue licensing
transactions with considerable enthusiasm.
The licensing literature has often described information
asymmetry in biotech licensing transactions largely because it
was expected to be there. That it is not seen in our analysis
indicates that the parties to licensing transactions are able to
achieve an adequately symmetrical understanding of the product
and its potential to avoid a Lemons Problem. The explanation
may differ between research and clinical stage transactions. At
the preclinical stage, the impressively low rates of success mean
that neither party has access to information that would enable it
to predict the ultimate outcome. In that respect, the preclinical
licensing business is less like a market for lemons than for buying
lottery tickets—that is, almost all drug development projects
will be the equivalent of Akerlof ’s totally defective car—or a
losing lottery ticket—with no ability of either party to predict
with confidence which product might turn out to be the one-
in-one-hundred opportunity that will be a successful drug. Once
the product moves into clinical testing, information symmetry
continues, but probably for different reasons. As predictability
gradually increases through the clinical development process,
the FDA’s requirements for rigorous data collection ensure that
licensees can, with diligent effort, become as knowledgeable
as licensors. Even then, drug development remains remarkably
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unpredictable, but licensors and licensees share that problem
equally, thanks to the regulatory environment and a due diligence
process designed to avoid any potential lemons. In short, because
the Lemons Problem exists in theory, it does not appear to exist
in practice.
Even though the Lemons Problem may not exist, it still
makes sense to teach MBAs about it. The concerns raised by
Akerlof ’s hypothesis have created a licensing environment in
which the licensees’ due diligence process is extremely detailed
and quite lengthy. It is not unusual for critical experiments
to be repeated in a different laboratory, for lab notebooks to
be scrutinized by scientific experts, and for individual patient
records to be analyzed by health professionals, all to ensure
that the information provided by the licensor is complete and
correct. Moreover, the regulatory process required for human
clinical testing necessarily creates a large body of information
that is designed for the FDA’s use, but which is equally valuable
for potential licensees in creating a level and symmetrical
playing field for the two parties to consider a transaction.
In short, by the time the due diligence process is complete,
a knowledgeable licensee should have as much information
about the licensing candidate as it does for its own products
at the same stage of development, hence our finding that
the success rates of in-licensed and in-house products are
comparable.
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